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RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
ASKING FOR THE IMPOSSIBLE?
Teresa Stanton Collett*
Advocates for recognition of same-sex marriage are celebrating again.
In February 1998, an Alaskan trial court in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Sta-
tistics' declared that the government must show a compelling state inter-
est justifying the statutory definition of marriage as "a civil contract en-
tered into by one man and one woman ...." In declaring the Alaska
statute constitutionally suspect, the court relied upon state constitutional
privacy protection, which extends to situational and decisional privacy."4
The court opined that the choice of a life partner is within the realm of
decisional privacy, stating that "[g]overnment intrusion into the choice of
a life partner encroaches on the intimate personal decisions of the indi-
vidual. This the Constitution does not allow unless the state can show a
compelling interest 'necessitating the abridgment of the... constitution-
ally protected right."'5
While similar in outcome, the Alaskan court diverged sharply from the
jurisprudential trail blazed almost five years ago by two justices of the
Hawaii Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Baehr v. Lewin.6 In Baehr,
Justices Moon and Levinson declared that the state constitutional protec-
tion against sex-based discrimination required the State of Hawaii to
Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law, affiliated with Texas A&M University. I
am grateful for the assistance and friendly criticism I received from David Coolidge, Cath-
erine Burnett, Russell Hittenger, Lynn Wardle, Tobin Sparling, Sally Langston, Elisa Ug-
arte. While none of them agrees entirely with this article, and some disagree with most of
the ideas presented, each of them improved it considerably. A substantial portion of Part
II of this article originally appeared in Teresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the
Positive Law, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1996).
1. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. 1998).
2. Id. at* 1.
3. Situational privacy extends to conduct occurring in traditionally private settings,
like the home or the marital bedroom. The Brause court referred to Ravin v. State, 537
P.2d 494 (Alaska 1974), in which the Alaska Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
statute prohibiting adult possession of marijuana for personal home use. See Brause at *3
(recognizing fundamental privacy rights).
4. See Brause 1998 WL 88743 at *3 (relying upon Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965)). The Brause court suggested that government intrusion into intimate deci-
sional privacy rights was improper. See id.
5. Id. at *5 (quoting Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159, 170 (Alaska 1972)).
6. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
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confer the legal status of marriage on same-sex partners, absent a com-
pelling state interest in reserving that status for couples comprised of one
man and one woman.7 Unlike Judge Michalski in Brause, however, the
entire Baehr court agreed that the state constitutional right to privacy
provided no fundamental right to same-sex marriage. To establish such a
right, the plaintiffs in Baehr would have had to show that their claim was
either "so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people
that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of
liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions[,]" or that it was "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such
that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed."9 Neither
standard was satisfied by the Baehr plaintiffs.
Upon remand, the trial court ruled that the State was equally unsuc-
cessful in establishing that marriage inherently requires a man and a
woman. This left little legal justification for the statutory limitation of
marriage to unions of one man and one woman. On December 3, 1996,
the Hawaiian trial court held that the sex-based statutory classification
defining marriage violated the Hawaii Constitution's equal protection
clause."
Implementation of the order was stayed at the State's request, pending
review by the Hawaii Supreme Court." The Hawaii Supreme Court has
yet to pass on this ruling by the trial court. This delay may be the result
of judicial prudence in the face of an upcoming state-wide vote on a con-
stitutional amendment providing: "[t]he legislature shall have the power
to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples."' 2 Nonetheless, the fact re-
mains that the most recent judicial pronouncements on the question of
same-sex marriage in Hawaii and Alaska are both resoundingly affirma-
tive.
How can this be? While most Americans living within the continental
United States tend to think of Alaska and Hawaii as exotic vacation
7. See id. at 67.
8. Id. at 57.
9. Id.
10. See Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *22 (Haw. Cir. Ct.
1996); see also HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (Hawaii's equal protection clause).
11. See Baehr v. Miike, 950 P.2d 1234 (Haw. 1997) (judgment decision); see also
David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of
Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201,210 n.37 (1998).
12. H.B. 117, 19th Leg. (Haw. 1997). For the political history of this amendment and
careful analysis of its constitutionality, see David Orgon Coolidge, The Hawaii Marriage




spots rather than sister states, their system of laws and democratic gov-
ernance are similar to those of the other forty-eight states. Yet courts in
both states have now reached a result consistently rejected by state leg-
islatures throughout the country.13 In fact, the Alaska statute at issue in
Brause was enacted to avoid the result reached in Hawaii in Baehr v.
Lewin. 4
The Hawaiian and Alaskan decisions are grounded in two fundamental
errors. First, these courts have engaged in what has been called "the ju-
dicial usurpation of politics." " This occurs when courts constitutionalize
issues most properly addressed by the legislature. Invoking vague consti-
tutional provisions like "privacy," the Brause and Baehr courts struck
down statutes that failed to conform with the political judgment of the
judges, thus substituting their will for that of the people or their repre-
sentatives.
The second error of the Baehr and Brause courts is committed by
many government officials. They err in the belief that marriage is cre-
ated, rather than recognized, by the state. Marriage is a reality created
by the commitment and actions of the couple. State involvement with
marriage arises not because it is the source of the marital relationship,
but because it encounters the reality of that relationship in the lives of its
citizens. Government accommodates and supports marriage because of
its beneficial effects on society.
The purpose of this article is to address the second error-the idea that
marriage is created by the state, and thus can be modified by judicial or
legislative fiat without concern for how those modifications comport with
reality. Part I describes the ideal of marriage, and the benefits to society
that flow from recognition and support of this ideal. While five primary
characteristics of marriage are discernible, I argue that only two benefit
society directly. These elements are the procreativity of marriage and
the mutual support of spouses. Government has a powerful interest in
encouraging conformity with the ideal of marriage to the degree that
13. Between 1993 and 1997, bills recognizing same-sex marriage were introduced and
rejected in seven states. See Partners Task Force for Gay & Lesbian Couples, Legislative
Reactions to Hawaii Same-Sex Marriage (visited March 14, 1998)
<http://www.buddybuddy.com> [hereinafter Partners Task Force]. For a description of
the political maneuvers on this issue, see Coolidge, supra note 11; see also Catholic Ha-
waii, In Defense of Marriage: The Same-Sex Marriage Controversy in Hawaii and the Na-
tion (visited September 3, 1998) <http://www.pono.net/policy/samesex-marriage/ssm-
sub.html>.
14. See Partners Task Force, supra note 13.
15. See generally Symposium, The End of Democracy?: The Judicial Usurpation of
Politics, 67 FIRST THINGS 18 (1996).
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conformity encourages the development of these characteristics.
I suggest that these social benefits can be accrued most effectively by
identifying their source within the marital relationship. Procreation pri-
marily occurs through heterosexual intercourse. 6 Once brought into
being, children are best cared for by partners in permanent, committed
relationships. 7 Therefore, the state has a strong interest in crafting its
laws to channel procreative activity into such relationships. Society has
traditionally called such relationships marriage, and I argue that we
should return to this understanding of the state's role in encouraging and
sustaining the procreative and permanent aspects of the marital relation-
ship.
The second socially beneficial characteristic of marriage, mutual sup-
port, has no necessary connection with sexual activity, nor is it found ex-
clusively in marriage. Rather, mutual support is the product of consent
and commitment. These characteristics can be found in many relation-
ships; some including sexual activity, others not. The elderly brother and
sister who have never married, and have cared for each other's needs for
a lifetime, is an example of a non-sexual relationship that is mutually
supportive. Gay and lesbian couples committed to sharing their lives
may also be examples of mutually supportive relationships having sexual
components.
The presence or absence of a sexual component, however, is not de-
terminative of the couple's capacity to provide mutual support. Recog-
nizing the value of mutually supportive relationships to society, and their
existence independent of sexual activity, the Hawaiian Legislature cre-
ated a new legal status called "reciprocal beneficiaries."'" In Part II of
this article, I argue that the state may properly seek to promote the mu-
tually supportive aspect of these relationships.
In Part III, I conclude that state recognition of marriage should remain
reserved to opposite-sex relationships involving partners who are com-
mitted to the ideal of marriage, characterized by permanence, exclusivity,
mutual support, and openness to the creation of new life. All other rela-
tionships, whether same-sex or opposite-sex, involving exclusive mutual
support for an extended duration, may be recognized by the state
16. While technology now allows human life to be created in ways other than sexual
intercourse, even those alternative methods of conception require a sperm and an egg.
The vast majority of babies, however, are still "made" the old-fashioned way.
17. For an extended discussion of homosexual parenting, see generally Lynn D.
Wardle, The Potential Impact of Homosexual Parenting on Children, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
833.
18. 31 HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C (Michie Supp. 1997).
1248 [Vol147:1245
Asking the Impossible
through some system of registration similar to the reciprocal beneficiar-
ies system adopted in Hawaii, but should not be equated with marriage.
I. THE IDEAL OF MARRIAGE
The ideal of marriage constitutes what I have called the "metaphysical
reality" of marriage in prior articles. 9 This reality provides the basis for
human relationships. Perhaps Pope John Paul II said it best when he de-
scribed marriage as a communion of two giving rise to a community of
persons greater than the two.20 Marriage, as a communion of two, re-
quires a total gift of self to the spouse. This gift includes sharing not only
the mind, body, and spirit of a person, but their past, present and future
as well. It encompasses not only the willing offering of self, but the lov-
ing reception and embrace of the other."
Through the marital act of sexual intercourse, the man and the woman
grant access to the most intimate regions of their bodies, and more im-
portantly, they grant access to the most intimate regions of their spirits.
The vulnerability created by mere physical nudity and contact is of little
consequence when compared to the emotional and intellectual vulner-
ability experienced during lovemaking. Therefore, it is important to dis-
tinguish marital lovemaking from those acts of sexual intercourse that
satisfy only physical appetites or economic needs. Neither casual sex nor
acts of prostitution constitute the marital act of sexual intercourse.
These acts seek only momentary gratification and are not ordered to-
ward deepening the mutual commitment that is a necessary precondition
to, and component of, marriage.
In contrast, the marital act of sexual intercourse experienced in its
most potent form is a tumultuous and ecstatic union arising from the to-
tal sharing of mind, body, and soul. Nothing is held back from the
spouse-no barriers are imposed to union. When making love, both the
man and the woman surrender the illusion of control in exchange for the
reality of communion.2 By making love, the woman chooses to allow the
19. See Teresa Stanton Collett, Marriage, Family and the Positive Law, 10 NOTRE
DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467,471 (1996).
20. See Pope John Paul II, Familiaris Consortio (On The Family) 18 (1981); Pope
John Paul II, Letter to Families, reprinted in 23 ORIGINS 638, 641-42 (1994); see also 2
GERMAIN GRISEZ, THE WAY OF THE LORD JESUS: LIVING A CHRISTIAN LIFE 654
(1993).
21. See POPE JOHN PAUL II, ORIGINAL UNITY OF MAN AND WOMAN: CATECHESIS
ONTHE BOOK OF GENESIS 116-17, 131 (1981).
22. See KAROL WOJTYLA (POPE JOHN PAUL II), LOVE AND RESPONSIBILITY 99
(H.J. Willetts trans., 1981). The Pope stated that:
If marriage is to satisfy the demands of the personalistic norm it must embody re-
1998] 1249
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man to enter her body. She embraces the possibility that they will be
joined together beyond their lifetimes through the creation of a child.
The man accepts this invitation, implicitly assenting to sharing not only
this moment of pleasure, but the sharing of the future, through the ardu-
ous but rewarding task of raising children created by the union. Thus the
object of marriage and its "signature act" of consummation, marital in-
tercourse, is to transcend both the individual lovers and their limited ex-
istence in time. It is to permeate every aspect of the present relationship
with the love of the couple, and extend it into the future by the creation
of a new person as well.23 This object can only be realized by comple-
mentary persons-male and female partners-within the marital rela-
tionship.
Through the marital union, heterosexual partners experience a com-
pleteness previously unknown to them as individuals. This completeness
arises from the complementarity of the two persons. They are distinct
persons, yet made for each other, as evidenced by the creative capacity of
their union on all levels. The union of their minds is evidenced by the
willing exchange of their thoughts and perceptions of their experiences.24
The union of their souls is evidenced by their loving embrace of the mys-
terious other who is their spouse. The union of their bodies is evidenced
by the procreative potential of marital intercourse.
II. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
The metaphysical reality of marriage, initiated in the original consent
and commitment of the couple, is provided through the mutual support
ciprocal self-giving, a mutual betrothed love. The acts of surrender reciprocate
each other, that of the man and that of the woman, and though they are psycho-
logically different in kind, ontologically they combine to produce a perfect whole,
an act of mutual self-surrender.
Id.
23. Many commentators use this theory to explain high birth rates in war ravaged na-
tions. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson, Bosnian Women Repudiate Death by Giving Birth, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 1995, at Al.
24. In WAR AND PEACE, Tolstoy offers this example:
As soon as Natasha and Pierre were alone they too began to talk as only husband
and wife can talk - that is, exchanging ideas with extraordinary swiftness and per-
spicuity, by a method contrary to all the rules of logic, without the aid of pre-
misses, deductions or conclusions, and in a quite peculiar way. Natasha was so
used to talking to her husband in this fashion that a logical sequence of thought
on Pierre's part was to her an infallible sign of something being wrong between
them. When he began proving anything or calmly arguing, and she, led on by his
example, began to do the same, she knew that they were on the verge of a quar-
rel.
2 LEo N. TOLSTOY, WAR AND PEACE 1394 (Rosemary Edmonds trans., 1978) (1869).
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provided by the partners, and its permanence, exclusivity, and openness
to the creation of new life." It is these characteristics that have tradition-
ally been the concern of positive law.
A. Permanent Duration
In her historical review of the institution of marriage in Western Euro-
pean nations, Professor Mary Ann Glendon found that marriage has al-
ways been defined as a relationship of extended duration, but subject to
dissolution by mutual consent during many periods of history. 6 With the
rise of Christianity's influence, marriage came to be viewed as a lifetime
conmitment, subject to dissolution only for grave reasons." Once estab-
lished, this ideal of marriage as a lifetime commitment held sway in
Western European countries until the mid-1960's. Laws then began to
recognize or expand the application of no-fault and mutual consent di-
vorce statutes. This change in the positive law has led to multiple se-
quential marriages?0
The resulting "divorce revolution," however, is under attack.3' Calls
for recognition that permanent marriage should be the presumption of
the positive law, absent compelling reasons for dissolution, come from
divergent groups for a variety of reasons. Reviewing the undisputed evi-
dence that men prosper and women and children suffer economically af-
ter divorce, some feminists now support a return to a requirement of
25. See Collett, supra note 19, at 471 (detailing these characteristics).
26. See MARY ANN GLENDON, THE TRANSFORMATION OF FAMILY LAW: STATE,
LAW AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE 17-34 (1989).
27. See id
28. See id. at 149.
29. See idt; cf Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-Fault Divorce, 31
FAM. L.Q. 269, 296 (1997) ("At least thirty-eight out of fifty-three U.S. jurisdictions consider
fault in awarding divorce, property division, or alimony.").
30. Some commentators refer to this as "serial polygamy." See, e.g., Robert J. Levy,
Rights and Responsibilities for Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 195 (1993);
Daniel D. Polsby, Ozzie and Harriet Had It Right, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 531, 533
(1995).
31. See generally ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY 258-61 (1991);
DIANE MEDVED, THE CASE AGAINST DIVORCE (1989) (describing numerous interviews
with divorced individuals who recognize the costs exacted by the breakup of their marriages);
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985) (discussing
the negative social and economic effects of the divorce revolution on women and children).
But see STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 255-81 (1992) (suggesting that significant family harm is caused by social
and market indifference rather than marital dissolution).
1998] 1251
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cause for divorce." The same evidence convinces some fiscal conserva-
tives that protection of the public purse from claims for assistance com-
pels a rethinking of no-fault divorce.33 Advocates for a return to tradi-
tional morality argue that permanency in marriage is required to provide
stability in rearing the next generation and mutual support throughout
the lives of the spousesm Religious arguments also support a return to
permanency on the basis of the metaphysical reality of marriage."
Responding to these critiques, many states have reestablished fault as
a consideration in the division of property or have lengthened the wait-
ing periods required before a divorce decree becomes final. The most
innovative response has been the Louisiana Legislature's enactment of a
two-prong licensure system.36 Opposite-sex couples applying for mar-
riage licenses are given the opportunity to elect to have their marriage
treated as a covenant marriage. By this election, the couple commits to
taking all reasonable steps to preserve their marriage if problems arise.37
Absent serious fault by one of the parties, they agree to the extension of
32. Cf Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social
Change: A Study of Rhetoric and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce,
1983 Wis. L. REV. 789, 827-30 (noting that many women are economically disadvantaged by
the policy rationales underlying no-fault divorce). But see Martha Heller, Note, Should
Breaking-Up Be Harder to Do?: The Ramifications a Return to Fault-Based Divorce Would
Have Upon Domestic Violence, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 263, 265-66 (1996) (opposing a re-
turn to fault-based divorce).
33. Compare Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23 J.
LEGAL STUD. 869, 870 (1994) (arguing that "it is time to question whether unilateral no-fault
divorce is worth its costs to the institution of marriage"), and Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational De-
cisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1990) (noting criticism of
no-fault divorce), with Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse
on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L.
REV. 67, 119-24 (1993) (advocating a partnership model for divorce proceedings to ameliorate
unjust economic disparities resulting from no-fault divorce schemes).
34. Cf. Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce Conundrum, 1991 BYU L.
REV. 79,81 (noting the failure of no-fault divorce to balance the permanency of marriage with
the need to cure the failure of fault grounds).
35. See Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families, supra note 20, at No. 7; see also The
Ramsey Colloquium, The Homosexual Movement: A Response by the Ramsey Colloquium,
FIRST THINGS at 15-21 (visited Mar. 1994) <http://www.Firstthings.com/FTissues
/FT9403/homo.hmtl>; cf. ASAF A. A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 124
(4th ed. 1974) ("[A contract regarding marriage] may also provide for the dissolution of
the marriage by the wife, without the intervention of the court."); Blu Greenberg, Women
and Judiasm, in CONTEMPRARY JEWISH THOUGHT: ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON CRITICAL
CONCEPTS, MOVEMENTS, AND BELIEFS 1039, 1046 (Arthur A. Cohen & Paul Mendes
Flohr eds., 1987) ("A Jewish marriage is terminated by either death or the giving of a get,
the writ of divorce.").
36. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 102-03 (West 1993 & Supp. 1998); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 9:224, :225, :234, :245 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
37. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:273A (1) (West Supp. 1998).
1252 [Vol147:1245
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required time periods prior to the entry of a final divorce decree in order
to enhance the chances of reconciliation." Through this system, the
Louisiana Legislature provides at least partial protection of the expecta-
tions of those who enter marriage believing that it is permanent com-
mitment.39
B. Mutually Supportive
Mutual support is another characteristic of marriage that has been rec-
ognized throughout history and in all cultures. ° Often articulated in
41 . . 42state statutes' and judicial opinions, this duty encompasses both the
sharing of emotional43 and financial resources." This sharing of resources
is the basis for the positive law governing spousal privilege,45 taxation,
and property ownership. It is presumed in laws defining creditors' rights
and governmental entitlements, and is a major consideration in crafting
38. See id. § 307A(5), (6).
39. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Beyond Baehr: Strengthening the Definition of Mar-
riage, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 277 (1998). For a general defense of issuing multiple types of
marriage licenses, see Christopher Wolfe, The Marriage of Your Choice, FIRST THINGS,
Feb. 1995, at 37-38.
40. See GLENDON, supra note 26, at 110-13 (examining mutual support in the context of
economic relations and household maintenance).
41. See, e.g., LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 1993) (defining mutual duties); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.03 (Anderson 1996) (defining support obligations); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.001.(2) (West 1993) (stating that a marital partners owe each other "mutual responsibil-
ity and support").
42. See, e.g., Dunaway v. Dunaway, 560 N.E.2d 171,176 (Ohio 1990) ("It is clear to us
that when parties marry they assume mutual obligations of maintenance and support. It is a
conscious election to share life together, and this necessarily includes financial circum-
stances."); Brookhart v. Brookhart, No. 93CA1569, 1993 WL 483206 at *7 (Ohio App. 1993)
("It is clear to us that when parties marry they assume mutual obligations of maintenance and
support."); Landmark Med. Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145, 1152 (R.I. 1994) ("One of the
principal incidents of marriage that continues to evolve has been the obligation of mutual sup-
port."); Braatz v. Labor & Indus. Rev. Comm'n, 496 N.W.2d 597,600 (Wis. 1993) ("Wisconsin
law imposes a mutual duty of general support upon married couples, but there is no compara-
ble duty of support imposed upon adult companions.").
43. See Blazek v. Superior Ct., 869 P.2d 509, 513-14 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (noting the
evidentiary privilege protecting marital communications, grounded in spousal intimacy and
mutual support).
44. See Carminucci v. Carminucci, No. FA940138767S, 1996 WL 88428, at *5 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. 1996). The court stated:
The figures offered by the defendant to prove how much he spent during the
marriage in order to obtain reimbursement for those expenditures are difficult to
accept seriously. One of the obligations of marriage is mutual support. If the de-
fendant feels that his expenditures somehow were not part of his obligations to
support his wife during that time, perhaps he needs enlightening on that point.
Id.
45. See Blasek, 869 P.2d at 512-14 (discussing spousal privilege).
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laws regarding the obligations that continue after divorce.
Mutual support recognizes the natural division of labor which evolves
when people undertake shared tasks-"You cook dinner, and I'll clean
up afterward." This allocation of tasks is one way that couples create a
shared life. Alternatively, the common law recognized that many mar-
ried couples arranged this sharing of day-to-day tasks by spheres of
authority. Wives were responsible for home and hearth and often
reigned unchallenged in domestic matters.46 Husbands, with little input
from their wives, created or acquired the resources necessary to make
domestic life possible .4 While modern conveniences and service provid-
ers have lessened the time required to maintain a home-we no longer
must make our soap, bake our bread, or sew our family's clothes-this
division of labor continues to be observed by many families, particularly
while raising young children. 4' Regardless of the specific form adopted by
any particular couple, mutual support and sharing of day-to-day tasks
remains a fundamental characteristic of marriage.
C. Consensual and Committed
Initial consent is another characteristic of marriage that is uniformly
recognized throughout Western European nations.49 Yet it is important
to distinguish initial consent to the marriage from the current, yet perni-
cious idea that a marriage continues to exist legitimately only when hus-
band and wife give continuing consent. One of the myths of our day is
that any obligation to another must be the result of consent. Reflection
reveals both the inaccuracy and undesirability of such a state of affairs.
Many important obligations arise in relationships that are not the prod-
uct of explicit consent by the participants. At least two morally signifi-
cant relationships arise before we are capable of even the most rudimen-
tary consent-parent-child and citizen-state. The newborn does not
consent to either of these relationships, yet the child owes certain duties
and has certain rights by virtue of these relationships.
How do the obligations of marriage differ from those of parent-child
or citizen-state? Unlike the status of citizen, daughter, or son, the status
of wife or husband is dependent upon consent for its creation. This is
true because of the fundamental nature of marriage. There can be no
gift of self from the unwilling giver. Obedience, protection, sharing of
46. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 7-8 (1985) (discussing women's role in the home).
47. See id; see also Wardle, supra note 17.
48. See Brinig & Crafton, supra note 33, at 875-76.
49. See GLENDON, supra note 26, at 38.
1254 [Vol 47:1245
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possessions-all of these can be received from an unwilling giver, but not
the essence of marriage. Thus consent must exist at the outset.50
However, consent to marriage is not the omniscient exercise of en-
lightened self-interest that much of modern contract law envisions. In-
stead it is a statement of personal commitment-an agreement to will the
good of another consistently through the gift of self.5 This is true be-
cause the decision to marry is made with incomplete knowledge. At the
time of the marriage ceremony, it is impossible to understand fully the
past experiences and present desires of the other. No amount of "due
diligence" will completely eliminate this fact. Even more mysterious are
the future events that both husband and wife must respond to as they live
out their commitment to be married. Thus what begins by consent con-
tinues, not by continuous reconsideration and renewal of the initial con-
sent, but by acts of will, intellect, spirit and body consistent with the
commitment expressed by the initial "I do."
D. Exclusive
Marriage, as a total gift of self between husband and wife, is most fully
experienced in an exclusive relationship. Implicit in the idea of exclusiv-
ity is the loyalty and intimacy enjoyed within the "bonds of matrimony."
Exclusivity is a necessary condition for the complete revelation of self
that marriage entails. In part, exclusivity eliminates any basis for com-
parison. This avoids the danger of devaluing the unique gift of the
50. See Pope John Paul II, Letter to Families, supra note 20, at Nos. 8, 10, 11, see also
FYZEE, supra note 35, at 88. Fyzee states:
Juristically, [marriage] is a contract and not a sacrament. Qua contract, it has
three characteristics: (i) there can be no marriage without consent; (ii) as in a
contract, provision is made for its breach, to wit, the various kinds of dissolution
by act of parties or by operation of law; (iii) the terms of a marriage contract are
within legal limits capable of being altered to suit individual cases.
Id.; see also Greenberg, supra note 35, at 1045 ("Rabbinic law states that a woman may not
be married without her consent.").
51. See Pope Paul VI, Humanae Vitae (Of Human Life), in 5 THE PAPAL ENCYCLICALS
1958-1981, at 225 (Claudia Carlen Ihm ed., 1990). Pope Paul VI stated that:
[marriage is principally] an act of the free will, whose trust is such that it is meant
not only to survive the joys and sorrows of daily life, but also to grow, so that
husband and wife become in a way one heart and one soul, and together attain
their human fulfillment.
It is a love which is total-that very special form of personal friendship in
which husband and wife generously share everything, allowing no unreasonable
exceptions and not thinking solely of their own convenience. Whoever truly
loves his partner loves not only for what he receives, but loves that partner for
the partner's own sake, content to be able to enrich the other with the gift of
himself.
Id (emphasis in original).
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spouse, and the damage suffered from being evaluated, rather than
loved.
Also, limiting marriage to monogamous relationships affirms the
equality of husband and wife. Each is the exclusive object of the other's
affection and attention. In some societies recognizing polygamous mar-
riage, the danger of wives being treated unequally is addressed by statu-
tory requirements. Judicial approval of multiple unions is required, and
that is conditioned upon a finding that the economic circumstances of
each wife is assured, and that "there is no serious doubt regarding equal
treatment for all wives. '52 While these requirements seemingly promise
equality among the wives, no attention is given the inherent inequality
between husbands and wives as persons. The husband receives the un-
diluted devotion of several women, while each wife receives only a par-
tial portion of the man's love and attention." This inequality may come
to be viewed as a comparative measure of the worth of each spouse, re-
sulting in a devaluing of women-both in the home and in the larger so-
ciety. This inequality of persons may be the basis for the Supreme
Court's observation that polygamy is inconsistent with our constitutional
system of government.-
E. Open to the Creation of New Life
The expansive nature of married love between complementary persons
is most fully realized in the creation of children. By conceiving and nur-
turing children, the couple exhibits a willingness to be joined together
52. HARRY D. KRAUSE, FAMILY LAw: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 6-7 (3d
ed. 1990).
53. See generally Genesis 29-35 (providing a Biblical example in the story of Jacob, Leah,
and Rachel of the consequences of unequal devotion to two wives).
54. This may be the unstated premise of the Court in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145, 165-66 (1878), which reasoned:
Upon [marriage] society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily
required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or polygamous marriages are
allowed, do we find the principles on which the government of the people, to a
greater or less extent, rests. Professor Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriar-
chal principle, and which, when applied to large communities, fetters the people
in stationary despotism, while that principle cannot long exist in connection with
monogamy.
Idt
Responding to claims that recognizing same-sex unions as marriages could result in rec-
ognition of polygamous unions, Professor Maura Strassberg argues that monogamy is the
marital characteristic that forms the foundation of political liberalism, rather than a cou-
ple's sexual identity. See Maura I. Strassberg, Distinctions of Form or Substance. Monog-
amy, Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1501, 1519 (1997).
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beyond their lifetimes. Willingly bearing children evidences faith in the
goodness of life, regardless of the present circumstances.5
Many contemporary judges and commentators ground the state's rec-
ognition of marriage as a legal institution in the fact that children are
most commonly created and nurtured in the context of marriage. The
opinion of the United States District Court for the Central District of
California in Adams v. Howerton is an example of this:
[T]he main justification in this age for societal recognition and
protection of the institution of marriage is procreation, per-
petuation of the race. Plaintiffs argue that some persons are
allowed to marry and their union is given full recognition and
constitutional protection even though the above-stated justifica-
tion-procreation-is not possible .... They point to mar-
riages being sanctioned between couples who are sterile be-
cause of age or physical infirmity, and between couples who
make clear that they have chosen not to have children. Plain-
tiffs go on to claim that sanctioning such unions within the pro-
tection of legal marriage, while excluding their union, consti-
tutes an illegal discrimination against them. In my view, if the
classification of the group who may validly marry is over inclu-
sive, it does not affect the validity of the classification. In tradi-
tional equal protection terminology, it seems beyond dispute
that the state has a compelling interest in encouraging and fos-
tering procreation of the race and providing status and stability
to the environment in which children are raised. This has al-
ways been one of society's paramount goals. 6
Adams is representative of the reasoning contained in the majority of
55. See supra note 23 (discussing the occurrence of high birth rates during wartime).
56. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124-25 (C.D. Cal. 1980) (rejecting the claim
that homosexual unions should be recognized as marriages for immigration purposes), affd
on other grounds, 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) ("Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race."); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187,1195 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
The Singer court stated:
[I]t is apparent that the state's refusal to grant a license allowing the appellants to
marry one another is not based upon appellants' status as males, but rather it is
based upon the state's recognition that our society as a whole views marriage as
the appropriate and desirable forum for procreation and the rearing of children.
This is true even though married couples are not required to become parents and
even though some couples are incapable of becoming parents and even though
not all couples who produce children are married. These, however, are excep-
tional situations. The fact remains that marriage exists as a protected legal insti-
tution primarily because of societal values associated with the propagation of the
human race.
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cases considering claims for recognition of same-sex unions as mar-
riages. 7 When pressed to define the state's interest in regulating mar-
riage, courts traditionally have noted the desirability of a close connec-
tion between marriage, procreation and family."
III. STATE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE
This desirability forms the basis of state recognition of marriage as well
as the basis for earlier attempts to limit sexual intercourse to marital rela-
tionships. These attempts included laws criminalizing fornication, adul-
tery, and prostitution, as well as judicial recognition of the torts of seduc-
tion and alienation of affection. 9 Many states still retain such laws, but
with the exception of laws concerning prostitution, they are rarely en-
forcedW
The more contemporary approach has been to privilege the marital
relationship without legally restricting sexual intercourse outside of mar-
57. See, e.g., Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1124-25; see also Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d
588, 589 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), app. dism'd, 409 U.S.
810 (1972); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. 1984); Singer, 522 P.2d at 1195.
58. Absent such an interest, it would be impossible to defend the current Missouri
Legislature proposal to pay a bounty for children born within wedlock. Therefore, only
the wisdom of this action is in question.
59. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1820 (1985). Schneider writes:
The old family law also enunciated what might be called an ascetic ideal. Sexual
restraint in various forms was a prominent part of this ideal. Laws prohibiting
fornication, cohabitation, and adultery confined sexual relations to marriage;
laws declining to enforce contracts based on meretricious consideration and laws
giving relief in tort for interference with the marital relationship sought to
achieve the same effect indirectly. Sexual relations were confined to monoga-
mous marriage by laws prohibiting polygamy and to exogamous marriage by laws
prohibiting incest. Sexual relations were confined to conventional heterosexual-
ity by sodomy laws. And laws regulating the sale of contraceptives and the use of
abortions made the "risks" of normal sexual relations difficult to avoid.
Id.
60. See Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1, 43 (1998) ("At least up
until very recently, most scholars and lawyers probably would feel safe to assert, without
pausing to do any research at all, that there is virtually no direct enforcement of the forni-
cation and adultery prohibitions in any jurisdiction in this country."); see also LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 345-47 (1993) (ex-
plaining that generally fornication is no longer criminalized and adultery no longer pun-
ished); RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 260-61, 309 (1992) (discussing rarely en-
forced adultery and consensual sodomy laws); Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and
Criminal Restrictions on Pre- and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1670-72,
1672 n.89 (1991) (arguing that criminal laws against adultery are unconstitutional and, in
practice, selectively enforced); Cathryn Donohoe, Adultery: It's Not Just a Sin, It's a
Crime, WASH. TIMES, June 29, 1990, at El (reporting that despite virtual lack of enforce-
ment, adultery remains a crime in 27 states and the District of Columbia).
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riage. 1 This policy has achieved mixed results under even the most gen-
erous assessment. Today, almost one-third of all children are born out of
wedlock,62 and sexually transmitted diseases are growing at an unprece-
dented rate for modem times.63 Most Americans still view adultery as a
serious breach of the marriage vows,64 yet the law provides no compensa-
tion or sanction for this harmful conduct.
Simultaneously, or perhaps because of the change in sexual mores,
people have begun to approach marriage with very different expecta-
tions. Instead of seeing marriage as a prerequisite to creation of a family,
it is now viewed by many as primarily a means to self-gratification.6 ' As
the trial court in Baehr noted:
[P]eople marry for a variety of reasons including, but not
limited to the following: (1) having or raising children; (2) sta-
bility and commitment; (3) emotional closeness; (4) intimacy
and monogamy; (5) the establishment of a framework of a long-
term relationship; (6) personal significance; (7) recognition by
society; and (8) certain legal and economic protections, benefits
and obligations.
Implicit in this listing is an assumption that each of these reasons is
equally valid for the individual, and equally valuable to society. The
Baehr trial court noted that legal recognition of marriage provided many
61. See Carlos A. Ball, Moral Foundations for a Discourse on Same-Sex Marriage:
Looking Beyond Political Liberalism, 85 GEO. L.J. 1871,1941-42 (1997).
While marriage is exalted as a valuable social institution in a normative sense,
heterosexual intimate acts that occur outside of marriage, such as adultery and
fornication, are usually tolerated by society .... The contemporary model of so-
cietal regulation of intimate heterosexual conduct, then, permits moral unbrack-
eting with respect to certain institutions (i.e., the recognition, as a matter of pub-
lic policy, that marriage is a normative good), but does not permit moral
condemnation alone to justify the use of coercive means to discourage consen-
sual intimate acts outside of that one (admittedly) exalted form of human rela-
tionship, namely, monogamous coupling.
Id. (citation omitted).
62. See Rules Outlined for Lucrative Race to Curtail Out-of-Wedlock Births, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 3, 1998, § 1, at 5.
63. See Thomas S. Quinn, Book Review, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1177, 1177 (1997)
(reviewing THE HIDDEN EPIDEMIC: CONFRONTING SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES
(Thomas R. Eng & William T. Butler eds., 1997)) (noting that the United States has the
highest rate of sexually transmitted diseases of any developed country).
64. See ANDREW M. GREELEY, FAITHFUL ATTRACTION 163 fig. 14.2 (1991) (chart-
ing the importance of fidelity survey results).
65. Cf GLENDON, supra note 26, at 28; Schneider supra note 59, at 1809 (explaining
that recent trends facilitating divorce represent decreasing public enforcement of life-long
fidelity moral standards and diminishing governmentally required mutual spousal respon-
sibility).
66. Baehr v. Miike, Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996).
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rights and benefits.67 Interestingly, both the trial and appellate opinions
are devoid of any references to the duties and responsibilities of mar-
riage.
Yet it is the duties and responsibilities created by marriage that make
the relationship valuable to society. Foremost among these duties are
the care of children conceived in the union, and the mutual support of
spouses. Of these two, only the first duty emerges from conduct that
should be the exclusive preserve of married couples. Sexual intercourse,
by virtue of its procreative potential, is properly limited to relationships
that can sustain and nurture any new life created by the activity. The
ability to channel intercourse into such relationships, and to enforce the
duty to sustain children created through intercourse, should be a primary
concern of the state in regulating marriage.
Advocates of recognizing same-sex unions as marriage anticipate this
argument and offer two responses. First, these authors argue that legal
recognition of marriage is no longer tied to procreation, as evidenced by
cases denying the state's ability to limit access to contraception. Relying
on cases like Griswold v. Connecticut and Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 they ar-
gue that the United States Supreme Court has "insisted that married
couples should be free to decide for themselves whether to use contra-
ceptives."7 This freedom results in the possibility that some heterosex-
ual unions may be intentionally rendered sterile. Recognition of these
unions as marriages, however, is inconsistent with the claim that procrea-
tion and parenting should be the state's primary concern in recognizing
and regulating marriage.
Separate from unions intentionally rendered sterile are unions involv-
ing elderly couples who are no longer able to conceive a child. These
unions are recognized as marriages by the state, even though these cou-
ples lack the requisite physical abilities necessary to procreate.7 Advo-
cates of same-sex unions attribute this over-inclusiveness to the fact that
the law reflects the preferences of "the vast majority of those who would
condemn homosexual activity while accepting the availability of divorce,
67. Id.
68. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. Stephen Macedo, Homosexuality and the Conservative Mind, 84 GEO. L.J. 261,
276-77 (1995).
71. See Hadley Arkes, Questions of Principle, Not Predictions: A Reply to Macedo, 84
GEO. L.J. 321 (1995); John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation", 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1049, 1067-68 (1994); Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage
and the Liberal Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 308 (1995); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical
Analysis of Constitutional Claims Against Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1.
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contraception, and premarital sex."72
Yet these two groups of heterosexual unions can be morally distin-
guished. In the first instance, the man and/or woman has intentionally
withheld from the union a major aspect of his or her being-reproductive
capacity-from the union. This withholding, if intended to be perma-
nent, makes the communion of persons constituting the reality of mar-
riage impossible. The couple is neither willing to permeate every aspect
of the present with the gifts of their love, nor are they willing for their
union to transcend time through the creation of children. It is this willful
refusal to enter full communion that distinguishes such relationships
from marriages.
In contrast, the second group, while physically unable to transcend
time through procreation, is capable of permeating the present with total
gifts of self. The partners create no intentional limitation on the com-
munion. Thus, these couples still create the metaphysical reality of mar-
riage through their actions. The biological limitation on that reality tran-
scending time through the creation of new life is unfortunate but does
not go to the heart of the marital union.
It is at this point that advocates of same-sex marriage make their sec-
ond, and to my mind, more persuasive argument. They argue that some
gay and lesbian couples are willing to make the same unconditional gifts
of self that are the ultimate purpose and acts of marriage.73 The fact that
the sexual manifestation of their gifts is through acts other than marital
intercourse does not preclude a tumultuous and ecstatic union arising
from the total sharing of mind, body, and soul. Each partner still shares
the most intimate aspects of his or her physical person, and each invites
the other into his or her secret hopes and dreams for the future. They
would argue that the reality of these shared lives constitutes marriage,
and similar to the elderly heterosexual couple, the biological limitation
on that reality transcending time through procreation is unfortunate but
does not go to the heart of the union we should call marriage.
Inherent in this argument is a presumption that all acts of commitment
and sexual intimacy are equivalent in their capacity to contribute to the
communion of persons that constitutes the metaphysical reality of mar-
riage. On this point, I disagree. The heterosexual union joins intrinsi-
72. Macedo, supra note 70, at 277.
73. See id. at 289 (noting that recognition of homosexual marriage promotes the same
values as heterosexual marriages); see also Ball, supra note 61, at 1938 (finding some em-
pirical evidence proving similarities between the love shared by homosexual and hetero-
sexual couples); Strassberg, supra note 54, at 1601 (providing explanations for marriage
based on both homosexual and heterosexual beliefs).
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cally different individuals. The differences between male and female
transcend culture, training, and environment. While they are manifest in
obvious biological differences, these differences are much broader than
"he has a penis" and "she has a vagina." They affect how we experience
the world. The degree to which these differences manifest themselves in
our behavior is largely influenced by our culture, training, and environ-
ment, yet the differences themselves cannot be entirely eradicated re-
gardless of culture, training, or environment.
The willing joinder of these inherent differences constitutes the mys-
tery of marriage. Different as men and women are, there is an innate de-
sire and unique capacity for union of the two. This desire and capacity is
captured by the word "complementarity." For most men and women,
their greatest fulfillment is achieved through the communion we call
marriage. Their union encompasses and celebrates the diversity of their
beings. While same-sex unions contain some diversity, in that they in-
volve two unique and distinctive persons, the differences are individual
rather than inherent. The similarities inherent in a same-sex union
weaken the union in the same manner that similarly formed pieces joined
by adhesive are less durably connected than interlocking pieces of the
same material joined by the same adhesive.
This in no way suggests that same-sex unions are incapable of endur-
ing. There is some evidence which suggests that most homosexual rela-
tionships are inherently unstable,74 but the present divorce rate among
heterosexual couples provides ample evidence that instability is not lim-
ited to the gay community." Today, the "adhesive" joining any couple is
comprised largely of their commitment and willpower, as well as their in-
dividual capacities to give and receive love.76 The living example of many
same-sex couples evidences the fact that some same-sex couples can and
do enter into their unions with the same commitment that is both a pre-
74. See Stanton L. Jones and Mark A. Yarhouse, Science and the Ecclesiastical Ho-
mosexuality Debates, 26 CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR'S REVIEW, 446, 471-72 (1997); Lynn D.
Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Mar-
riage by Redefining Marriage, 39 SOUTH TEXAS L. REV. 735, 760, 764-66 (forthcoming
1998); cf Yoel H. Kahn, The Keduskah of Homosexual Relationships, in ANDREW
SULLIVAN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: PRO AND CON 71, 76 (1997) (noting the author's
original belief, later refuted, as to the inherent instability of homosexual relationships).
75. But see GREELEY, supra note 64, at 35 (discussing that in 1989 two-thirds of
Americans were married to their first spouse, and "a little more than four-fifths of those
who are married have or have had only one spouse-the difference being those who have
divorced and not remarried.").
76. See generally Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20
HOFSTRA L. REV. 495 (1992) (explaining the role of the law in assisting these concepts).
77. See Kahn, supra note 74, at 76. Kahn describes his experience as follows:
1262 [Vol 47:1245
Asking the Impossible
condition to, and component of, authentic marriage.7 ' These examples
also demonstrate that the capacity to give and receive love is not re-
stricted on the basis of sexual preference. But these aspects of same-sex
unions are only relevant to their capacity to be mutually supportive, not
procreative. For this reason, it is appropriate for the state to distinguish
same-sex unions from the complementarity and procreative potential of
opposite-sex unions.
The state does not create marriage. It recognizes the pre-existing real-
ity. The reality of marriage necessarily requires a complementarity that
is absent from same-sex unions. It is this absence that precludes moral
recognition of same-sex unions as marriages.
Separate from the incapacity of same-sex unions to achieve the meta-
physical reality of marriage is the more obvious limitation on their pro-
creative potential. Because state recognition of marriage is primarily
concerned with encouraging the creation and nurturing of children in
stable, loving relationships, it is proper for the state to decline marital
recognition of unions that by their inherent nature are non-procreative.
Historically, concern for the creation and nurturing of children has mo-
tivated the state to encourage people to marry. To accomplish this goal,
marriage was given a privileged status among legal relationships. This
has changed in the past thirty years. Most of the laws encouraging mar-
riage over other forms of personal association no longer limit the per-
sonal activities of non-married people.7 ' Nor does the state seriously at-
When I arrived to assume my pulpit in San Francisco four years ago, deep
down I still believed that gay and lesbian relationships and families were, some-
how, not as real, not as stable, not as committed as heterosexual marriages. I
could tell many stories of what I have learned since. There are the two women
who have lived together for many years without familial or communal support,
who have endured long distances and job transfers, because employers thought
them both single and admitting their homosexuality would have endangered their
livelihoods, women who have cared for each other without benefit of insurance
coverage or health benefits or any legal protection ....
Mine is a synagogue living with AIDS. I have been humbled by the unques-
tioning devotion of the man who, for more than two years, went to work each
morning, calling intermittently throughout the day to check in on his partner, and
spent each night comforting, talking, preparing meals, and waking in the middle
of the night to carry his loved one to the bathroom .... The loving caregiver
stayed at his partner's side throughout the period of his illness and until his
death.
Id.
78. See Collett, supra note 19, at 470-77 (presenting the author's five definitive char-
acteristics of marriage); see also supra Part II (discussing these characteristics).
79. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (recognizing
the prevalence and social acceptance of nonmarital relationships in modern society).
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tempt to limit sexual intercourse to married couples." Through a broad
reading of the U.S. Constitution, courts have recognized a constitutional
right to privacy within the marital relationship.81 Intending to protect
marriage as an independent sphere of authority co-existing with the
state, the courts rendered the state powerless to favor marriage over the
individual rights of unmarried persons. Acknowledging the importance
of the decision to procreate within marriage, courts nonetheless trivial-
ized the importance of community support for that decision. Essentially,
the de facto rule of these cases is that procreation is so important to the
individuals involved that the community and state must be indifferent to
it. Such reasoning is unsound, and we are presently suffering the ill-
effects of these decisions.
Advocates for same-sex marriage are correct when they argue that
gays and lesbians are equally entitled to access any means of individual
gratification that the government provides. They are incorrect, however,
in their conception of marriage as a governmentally-created means to in-
dividual gratification. Marriage exists independent of the state. It is cre-
ated through the consensual act of self-giving by a man and a woman.
Each welcomes the total person of the other, a person who is inherently
different yet complementary. This union of difference expresses itself
beyond the present, by the creation of children. It is this potentiality of
the marital act that warrants state recognition and encouragement of
marriage. When such potential is conclusively absent as in same-sex un-
ions, or where opposite-sex couples intentionally and permanently fore-
close the procreative aspect of marriage, the state may properly recog-
nize and encourage the mutually supportive aspects of those relation-
ships, but it should not confuse those relationships with marriage.
IV. THE PROPRIETY OF RECOGNIZING MUTUALLY SUPPORTIVE
RELATIONSHIPS
Much of the strength of the claims by same-sex couples comes from
their legitimate desire to be recognized as mutually supportive." They
desire societal affirmation of the value of their relationships." They re-
sent the indifference signified by the absence of any legal recognition of
80. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443, 447,453-55 (1972) (holding that a state
may not prohibit contraceptive sales to unmarried people).
81. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485-86 (1965) (establishing a right
to privacy within the marital relationship).





their commitments, although most will readily agree that such indiffer-
ence is superior to the condemnation inherent in laws criminalizing sod-
M.84omy.
Society's indifference to these unions is understandable if the relation-
ships are reduced to only their sexual component. Because the sexual
activities of same-sex couples have no procreative potential, their con-
duct has no capacity to affect the lives of non-participants or enrich soci-
ety as a whole. At most, same-sex couples can claim that their expres-
sions of sexual intimacy have a unitive effect within their relationship.
The value of such expressions to society, however, is not readily appar-
ent. There are many private activities that unify individuals, yet society
does not endow them with any legal significance.
This response, however, trivializes the claims of same-sex marriage ad-
vocates. Their claim is broader than acknowledgment of their sexual ac-
tivities. They claim that same-sex unions are valuable because they are
based upon long-lasting commitments to love and care for one another.84
When recast this way, the claim for recognition of same-sex unions has
more force. The willingness of individuals to care for one another should
not be lightly disregarded by the community. Depending upon the na-
ture and scope of the commitment, society benefits from the partners'
willingness to sacrifice for each other.
Faced with this claim for recognition of same-sex marriage, Hawaii
created the status of "reciprocal beneficiaries."8 Any two unmarried
adults who are legally prohibited from marrying each other may file
declarations of a reciprocal beneficiary status relationship with the Ha-
waii Director of Health." After filing the declaration, the couple will be
entitled to:
[S]urvivorship rights (inheritance, workers' compensation bene-
fits, state retirement benefits), health-related benefits (hospital
visitation, private and public employee prepaid medical insur-
ance, auto insurance coverage, mental health commitments,
family and funeral leave), property (tenancy in the entirety, dis-
aster relief loans, public land leases), legal standing (wrongful
death, victim's rights, domestic violence family status) and other
miscellaneous benefits (University of Hawaii facilities use, ana-
84. See id
85. See Ball, supra note 61, at 1943 ("Homosexual relationships that are based on
commitment, love, and fidelity, are not immoral or amoral, but are in fact moral, and as
such should be recognized, supported, and accepted by society.") (emphasis in original).
86. 31 HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C (Michie Supp. 1997).
87. See id. § 572C-4 (stating the five requirements for obtaining valid reciprocal bene-
ficiary status).
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tomical gifts, government vehicle emergency use). 8
While this legislation is the "most comprehensive rights package for
nontraditional couples" in the United States,89 it differs from legal recog-
nition of same-sex marriage in several important respects. First, the
status is not based upon a common household or intimate relationship. 9°
Second, the relationship is terminated by marriage of either beneficiary,
or by filing a signed notarized declaration of termination." Third, it does
not require private employers to pay for benefits of reciprocal benefici-
aries. '2 Finally, it does not confer all marriage-related benefits.93
The act contains the Hawaii Legislature's findings indicating the need
for such legislation:
[T]here are many individuals who have significant personal,
emotional, and economic relationships with another individual
yet are prohibited by such legal restrictions from marrying. For
example, two individuals who are related to one another, such
as a widowed mother and her unmarried son, or two individuals
who are of the same gender. Therefore, the legislature believes
that certain rights and benefits presently available only to mar-
ried couples should be made available to couples comprised of
two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying one
another.94
The legislature identified a valid purpose not restricted to the gay and
lesbian community. Examples of others who benefit include the many eld-
erly individuals having no spouse or child to care for them.95
88. Daniel R. Foley, The State of Gay Marriage: Will Hawaii Lead the Way?, 20 FAM.
ADVOC. 39, 39 (1997).
89. Cheryl Wetzstein, Few Opt for Hawaii Unmarried-Couple Benefits, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 3, 1998, at A2 (quoting Honolulu lawyer Daniel R. Foley, counsel to the
same-sex couples in Baehr and an expert on homosexual rights).
90. See David Orgon Coolidge, Same Sex Marriage? Baehr v. Miike and the Meaning
of Marriage, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 17 (1997) (distinguishing Hawaii's reciprocal benefici-
aries law from federal congressional domestic partnership statutes).
91. See 31 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-7(a).
92. See Wetzstein, supra note 89 (reporting that "[riecently, a judge ruled that private
employers aren't required to give unmarried couples health benefits"); see also Coolidge,
supra note 90, at 17.
93. See 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 383, § 74. The Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, the rights and benefits extended
by this Act shall be narrowly interpreted and nothing in this Act shall be con-
strued nor implied to create or extend rights or benefits not specifically provided
herein.
Id.. see also Coolidge, supra note 89, at 17.
94. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 572C-2 (containing the Hawaii Legislature's findings).
95. See generally Lawrence A. Frolik & Alison P. Barnes, An Aging Population: A
Challenge to the Law, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 683 (1991) (discussing the benefits conferred on
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Such people often rely upon friends to assist them in day-to-day tasks or
times of need. Legal devices such as durable powers of attorney, living
wills, and joint tenancy make it possible to empower these friends with ex-
tensive authority, but only if the person is sophisticated enough to know of
the devices, and affluent enough to obtain the legal assistance necessary to
draft them. The creation of a reciprocal beneficiary relationship is much
simpler and provides more extensive rights.
The reciprocal beneficiary status also more accurately reflects the mutu-
ally supportive nature of many relationships. Mandatory inclusion in some
insurance programs recognizes the reality of our free market system of pro-
viding healthcare. While that system has played a significant role in devel-
oping the most advanced medical care in the world, an unintended conse-
quence is that some people are without health insurance. By including
reciprocal beneficiaries in government-sponsored insurance plans, Hawaii
has fulfilled the legitimate desire of people to assure the physical well-being
of those they care most about.
The requirement that reciprocal beneficiaries be legally prohibited from
marrying one another guarantees that state-recognized marital status will
not compete with reciprocal beneficiary status. To the extent that marriage
continues to impose any legally cognizable duties, the creation of another
legal status providing most of the benefits of marriage with none of its du-
ties would further diminish the limited channeling effect of current mar-
riage laws. Society's interest in promoting permanent, exclusive relation-
ships as the proper setting for the creation and nurturing of children
provides a compelling state interest to privilege marriage over any other le-
gal status. This interest is well served by limiting reciprocal beneficiary
status to individuals who cannot marry.
The absence of any requirement that reciprocal beneficiaries share a
household or intimate relationship is also consistent with the state interest
in promoting marriage and family over other personal relationships. In
contrast to domestic partnership laws which implicitly promote unmarried
unions as legitimate alternatives to marriage, the reciprocal beneficiary
status created by the Hawaiian Legislature is merely conditioned on mutual
consent.
Overall, the creation of reciprocal beneficiary status is a worthwhile en-
deavor. It affirms the commitments to provide mutual support made by
people who are legally unable to marry each other. It acknowledges the
true interdependence of people's lives, even in the absence of marriage or
family ties. By untangling the question of sexual conduct from emotional,
economic, and personal support, the Hawaii Legislature created a flexible
the elderly through these laws).
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device that rewards mutual commitment, while reserving the state imprima-
tur for the relationship that most benefits society-heterosexual marriage.
By the end of 1997, less than 300 couples had registered as reciprocal
beneficiaries. Of those, approximately one-quarter are siblings or elderly
parents and adult children. This figure is considerably less than the 20,000
couples that the Hawaii Department of Health had anticipated.96 It is also
considerably fewer than the number of people that might benefit from the
legislation. But the device is new and untested and strongly associated with
the gay and lesbian community. Both of these factors may make some re-
luctant to claim the benefits of the legislation. Hopefully as people gain ex-
perience with the status it will be recognized for what it is-legal recogni-
tion of mutually supportive relationships independent of any sexual activity
between the beneficiaries.
V. CONCLUSION
The manner in which people conduct their lives is diverse and complex.
Some choose to live alone, finding the burden of solitude offset by its free-
dom. Others choose to marry, offering a complete gift of self to another.
Still others choose temporary alliances, satisfying their need for compan-
ionship, while avoiding any permanent commitment.
Of all of these choices, marriage is the most beneficial to society. When a
man and a woman commit to mutual and complete self-giving, the union
assumes a unique character that has the potential qualitatively to surpass all
other human relationships. This union is best achieved through committed
lifelong monogamy. By the act of marital intercourse, these couples ex-
press both their present unity and their willingness to be joined together in
the creation of new life. When a child is conceived, marriage provides the
greatest opportunity to fully nurture the child to maturity. The state has a
compelling interest in supporting marriage as the best setting for the crea-
tion of and caring for children.
Same-sex unions may mirror the commitment, exclusivity, and perma-
nence of marriage, but they can never create new human life. Complemen-
tarity, with its paradoxical unity from diversity, is required for procreativity.
The biological inability of same-sex couples to give and receive the gift of
each other's fertility renders same-sex unions finite and sterile. Society has
no stake in the sexual union of these couples.
Such unions, however, are more than mere sexual couplings. They have
another dimension that is shared with many other relationships-that of
96. See Susan Essoyan, Hawaii Finds Slow Response to Domestic Partners Law,
DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Dec. 28,1997, at 5A, available in 1997 WL 16187525.
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mutual support. Same-sex couples, married couples, and deeply committed
friends experience the benefits of mutual support. For married couples this
support is a necessary incident of the union and is given legal effect through
many laws. People in other relationships rarely intend to share their lives
so fully, so the law has only limited provisions for commingling of property,
and joint or transferred decisionmaking.
With the creation of the status of reciprocal beneficiaries, Hawaii has ex-
panded the legal recognition of mutual support outside of marriage. By
limiting this status to those who cannot marry, Hawaii has simultaneously
recognized the diverse ordering of people's lives, while continuing to differ-
entiate and affirm the goodness of marriage, a reality that can be experi-
enced only by opposite-sex couples.
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